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Abstract: One goal of China’s Go Out policy is to create goodwill in countries around the world. At the 
same time, China’s growing economic engagement has provoked much criticism. This paper is the first to 
study whether these activities change the attitudes of individuals in developing countries towards China at 
both the national and subnational level. Using repeated cross-sectional survey data from the 
Latinobarómetro, we analyze whether and how growing amounts of exports, foreign aid, and foreign 
direct investment from China to Latin America affect opinions on China within 18 Latin American 
countries over the 2002-2013 period. We run instrumental-variables regressions by exploiting exogenous 
variation in the supply of Chinese exports, aid, and investment proxied by China’s market penetration of 
developing countries outside Latin America. In contrast to the widespread criticism, we do not find 
evidence that China’s growing economic activities in the respective countries deteriorate average attitudes 
towards China—neither at the national nor the provincial level. However, our results show that the young, 
educated, and economically privileged population develops more positive views of China. We interpret 
this as evidence that China’s economic engagement creates winners and losers. 
JEL classification: F14, F15, F21, F35, F61, O54, P33 
Keywords: public opinion, exports, development assistance, foreign direct investment, China, Latin 
America, anti-Sinicism, soft power 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the keys to a country’s international success is its image abroad. First, favorable opinions held by 
foreign citizens pay off economically. Economic research suggests that countries trade more with 
countries with which their citizens have stronger affinity (Disdier and Mayer 2007) and a higher level of 
trust (Guiso et al. 2009). Trade ties are also stronger if citizens admire a trading partner’s global influence 
(Rose 2016, forthcoming).1 Conversely, a bad image can also impose economic costs on countries by 
causing foreign consumers to launch boycotts (Antoniades and Clerides 2015; Heilmann 2016; Pandya 
and Venkatesan 2016). Second, favorable attitudes held by a foreign country’s populace also appear to 
enable closer cooperation in non-economic dimensions of foreign policy (Nye 2004; Goldsmith and 
Horiuchi 2012). Public opinion is of importance since a foreign country’s citizens can exert influence on 
political decisions regarding international cooperation by approving or disapproving of the actions of their 
respective political leaders (Milner and Tingley 2013). Highlighting the role of public opinion, Goldsmith 
et al. (2014: 90) expect that the United States and China “increasingly seek to pursue their international 
interests through currying favor among foreign elites and publics” to avoid the economic costs that would 
arise from violent conflict. 
Despite the economic and political benefits associated with “soft power,” the formation of 
attitudes towards foreign countries is poorly understood. The significant growth in Chinese economic 
presence in Latin America over the last two decades make this an ideal case to study the link between the 
international economic activity and public opinion formation in developing countries. Since the turn of 
the millennium, China has developed from being a minor actor with virtually no presence in Latin 
American countries to being one of their most important economic partners.2 China’s sudden arrival on 
this continent stands in contrast to its widespread and sustained expansion in Africa and Asia since the 
1950s (Dreher and Fuchs 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, China’s emergence in Latin America is the subject of fierce debate among 
policymakers and analysts. The wide range of perceptions held about China’s development impact in 
middle- and low-income countries is summarized as “monster or messiah” (Sun 2014) or “angel or devil” 
(Santiso 2007) by scholars and policymakers. Latin American media outlets also paint a mixed picture of 
China’s economic engagement. While China has been praised for its business potential, concerns related 
to sustainability, the environment, trade inequality, and intellectual property rights receive considerable 
negative news coverage (Ospina Estupinan 2017). Under the assumption that individuals alter attitudes in 
response to China’s growing economic activities, we expect to observe that China’s sharply growing trade, 
aid, and investment affect local citizens’ attitudes towards China. 
                                                          
1 Similarly, Guiso et al. (2009) find poor bilateral trust levels to reduce portfolio and direct investment between 
countries. 
2 Most notably, China’s OFDI in Latin America increased 200-fold between 2003 (US$ 15 million) and 2012 
(US$ 3 billion). 
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Using representative repeated cross-sectional survey data from the Latinobarómetro, we analyze 
whether the growing amounts of exports, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment from China to Latin 
America affect individuals’ opinions of China across 18 countries over the 2002-2013 period. The 
relationship between public perceptions and economic cooperation is likely to be reciprocal: economic 
cooperation can influence perceptions and vice versa. 3  To account for the endogeneity of China’s 
economic activities abroad, we construct instrumental variables from the interaction between a time-
varying exogenous variable with a variable that varies along the cross-sectional dimension (e.g., Werker 
et al. 2009; Nunn and Qian 2014). Inspired by the “China shock” instrument of Autor et al. (2013), time 
variation of the instrument stems from the market penetration of developing countries outside Latin 
America with Chinese exports, aid, and investments, respectively. To account for potential confounding 
factors, our regression specification includes standard individual-level parameters, time-varying country-
specific economic and political characteristics, and year- and country-fixed effects. To benchmark our 
results for China, we also analyze the link between the United States’ foreign economic activities and 
Latin American attitudes towards the United States.4 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first multi-country study to investigate the causal 
effects of China’s economic activities on its public perception in developing countries.5 In doing so, we 
contribute to the literature on attitudes towards international integration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Baker 2003; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Kono 2008; Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Chilton et al. forthcoming; 
and many more). The studies closest to ours are Kleinberg and Fordham (2010) and Hanusch (2012). The 
former find some evidence of a significant negative association between Chinese exports and unfavorable 
views of China in a sample of 47 countries. The latter shows that Chinese exports correlate negatively 
with favorable public opinion about China in Africa but finds the opposite to be true for Chinese 
investment. Since both papers only rely on cross-sectional variation, both sets of results might be biased, 
for example, because China chooses the location of its economic activities based on favorable public 
opinion. Our paper offers a decade-long analysis with a causal identification strategy. It is also the first 
quantitative analysis of opinions towards China in Latin America; the existing scholarly contributions 
rely on qualitative evidence only (Hearn 2012; Cornejo et al. 2013). 
To foreshadow our findings, our causal estimates show no average effects of China’s economic 
activities—be it trade, aid, or investment—in the respective countries on attitudes towards China. This 
                                                          
3 Hearn (2012) investigates resentment towards Chinese communities in Mexico and Cuba. He concludes that the 
frequent public reservations towards China have prevented these two countries from strengthening their bilateral ties 
with Beijing. Cornejo et al. (2013) focus on Mexican perceptions and conclude that, although opinions regarding the 
People’s Republic are heterogeneous, the general lack of trust towards China represents an obstacle for closer 
cooperation. 
4 Dietrich et al. (2018) discuss the role of public opinion for the United States. They highlight that “the maintenance 
of [its] global image [is] a central pillar of foreign policy, akin to elite-level diplomacy and the manufacturing of 
armaments.” 
5 Work by Blair and Roessler (2016) on Liberia shows that respondents in closer proximity to Chinese aid and 
investment projects have better perceptions of China but their data does not allow them to analyze variation over 
time. 
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null finding is robust to a battery of robustness checks where we introduce various changes to the sample, 
measurement of our variables, lag structure, and estimation method. This also holds when we analyze the 
effects of Chinese aid at the provincial rather than national level. We find more nuanced effects when 
analyzing the effects of Chinese activities for different strata of the population. Chinese aid and 
investment contribute to the formation of a more positive image among the educated and economically 
privileged population. China’s economic engagement also appears to contribute to more polarized 
opinions on China: more individuals develop either very positive or very negative opinions on China. We 
interpret this as suggestive evidence that China’s economic engagement creates winners and losers. 
Finally, in contrast to Chinese aid and opinions on China, we find that US aid is positively associated 
with opinions of the United States. 
Sensitivity towards the Chinese economic presence is high among the Latin American public. 
Chinese investors have a reputation of holding low labor and environmental standards. In some instances, 
this has led to protests.6 Critics denounce that Chinese investors bring their own laborers and thus do not 
contribute to—or even crowd out—domestic employment (Bräutigam 2009: 227ff). These developments 
provoked statements such as those made by Neil Dávila, then president of Mexico’s federal agency for 
the promotion of foreign commerce and investments: “We do not want to be China’s next Africa” 
(Fumento 2014: 1). Carlos Zúniga, a Nicaraguan Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
negotiator, referred to China as “an awakening monster that can eat us” (cited as in Gallagher and 
Porzecanski 2010: 1). The dramatic increases of Chinese exports to Latin America have also given rise to 
concerns about potential adverse effects such as the competitive pressure on local companies and the 
potentially negative implications for domestic employment (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2008; Sargent and 
Matthews 2009; Jenkins 2012).7 According to Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010: 51), China “threatened” 
92 percent of all Latin American manufacture exports in 2009 in the sense that Latin American 
manufacturers’ market share of those products increased at a slower rate than China’s (in some cases it 
even decreased). Chinese goods are often perceived as being associated with bad quality as well as with 
poor safety standards. This is why Mildler (2010: 1) even refers to the label Made in China as a “mark of 
shame” (see also Ramo 2007). If such negative perceptions of China dominate among the citizens 
throughout Latin America, we would expect a deterioration of attitudes towards China as its economic 
presence increases. 
                                                          
6 A recent example is a Chinese plan to build a 278 km-long canal through Nicaragua for US$50 billion. The 
Economist (2014) reports that this ambitious project might impair the livelihoods of thousands of local residents and 
destroy the country’s largest domestic water reservoir. Latin American workers also protest against the labor 
standards of Chinese firms and against the hiring of migrant workers from China, such as in the case of the 
Shougang Hierro mine in Peru (Romero 2010; Parish-Flannery 2012). 
7 In fear of a flood of low-cost products from the People’s Republic, policymakers across Latin America have 
reacted by imposing trade restrictions for some Chinese imports. According to Kotschwar (2014), between 2008 and 
2013, Latin American countries launched a total of 75 trade restrictions against China. This accounts for 70 percent 
of Latin America’s total trade restrictions that were introduced against foreign products during that period. 
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At the same time, there are reasons why China’s economic engagement could translate into an 
improvement of attitudes towards China over time. This could be caused either directly by economic 
benefits of trade, aid and investment that accrue to Latin American citizens, or indirectly by the effects 
observed by peers or portrayed in the media. First, regarding trade, economic theory suggests that 
consumers benefit as imports expand the variety of available products and yield lower prices (Krugman 
1979; Feenstra and Kee 2009: 245f). According to the IMF, the strong increases of raw commodities 
exports to China were associated with significant terms-of-trade improvements for countries such as 
Brazil and Chile (Elson 2014), contributing to their robust GDP growth during the past decade.8 Second, 
economists have argued that foreign investments can generally enlarge the existing stock of knowledge 
via training, skill diffusion, and other forms of knowledge transfer (e.g., DeMello 1997). Such human 
capital development and potential spillovers from higher salaries paid by foreign firms to the work force 
employed locally would yield benefits for the domestic economy (Blomström and Kokko 1998; Zhang 
2001; Görg and Greenaway 2004). If such beneficial effects are apparent and salient to citizens, they 
could cause an improvement of China’s image. Third, turning to foreign aid, the Chinese government 
uses aid projects explicitly to promote friendship with foreign countries (Lum 2009). Some Chinese aid 
projects, such as the China-Peru Friendship Center in Lima, even carry this purpose in their titles. As 
argued by Goldsmith et al. (2014), in order to affect opinions, aid needs to be need-oriented, long-lasting 
and visible. An important precondition is that the recipient population associates the aid project with the 
donor country (Dietrich et al. 2018). Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether individuals perceive 
an impact, attribute any consequences to Chinese economic activities, and—if opinions are affected—
whether positive or negative effects dominate in the formation of their opinions. 
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and explains 
our instrumental-variables approach to estimate the causal effects of China’s economic activities on 
individual attitudes towards China. In Section 3, we present our main results at the national level and test 
the robustness of these findings. We also analyze the effects of Chinese aid on opinions towards China at 
the provincial level. A comparison with the United States’ economic activities in Latin America serves as 
a benchmark. The final section concludes and highlights the implications from our findings. 
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
2.1 Dependent variable 
In order to empirically test how attitudes towards China change in response to the country’s growing 
economic engagement in Latin America, we employ data drawn from eleven waves of the representative 
survey Latinobarómetro (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2015). The data cover the years 2002 to 2011 and 
                                                          
8 At the same time, concerns about a potential overreliance of Latin American countries on their raw commodity 
exports to China loom large (Jenkins 2012; Kotschwar 2014). With the fall of commodity prices since 2014, the 
vulnerability of Latin America’s industries has become visible (Gruss 2014). 
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the year 2013. They consist of eleven repeated cross-sections with individual respondent data nested in 
178 different clusters at the country-year level.9 Interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews on an 
(almost) annual basis in 18 Latin American countries. Country samples are (sub)nationally 
representative.10 The sample size at the country-year level varies between 458 and 1,095 respondents 
during the time period under analysis. 
Our dependent variable is based on the following question: “Do you have a very good, good, bad, 
or very bad opinion of {x}?,” where “{x}” is replaced by either China or—for comparison—the United 
States.11 Following common practice (e.g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Kleinberg and Fordham 2010), we 
exclude in our main analysis all respondents who answered “Don’t know” and “No answer” when asked 
about their opinion on China.12 Figure 1 compares Latin Americans’ perceptions of China to the region’s 
hegemon, the United States. The countries above the 45-degree line, mostly Central American countries, 
are those that have a relatively better opinion of the United States, while those below the line, including 
the two largest Latin American countries Brazil and Mexico, are relatively more sympathetic to China. As 
can be seen from Figure 2, attitudes also show considerable variation over time. 
For our baseline specification, we recode respondents’ answers on the four-step scale in a binary 
variable ChinaOpinion, which takes the value of one when the respondent’s opinion on China is very 
good or good, and zero if it is bad or very bad. This procedure is in line with other empirical papers 
analyzing individual-level survey data (e.g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Kleinberg and Fordham 2010) and 
takes into account that participants’ answers tend to center around the median as they prefer moderate 
responses to extreme ones.13 The average probability of Latin American respondents holding a favorable 
opinion about China is 77 percent. Favorability rates for China are highest in Honduras, followed by 
Paraguay and Nicaragua over the 2002-2013 period (see column 1 of Table 1). Venezuela ranks in the 4th 
position of the China sympathizers, which is in line with expectations in light of the country’s socialist 
stance. 
 
                                                          
9 A panel structure would be preferable for this kind of analysis but such data are not available at the individual level. 
Yet, since the samples in each country-year cluster are drawn randomly from the respective cluster sample 
population, the independence assumption about the data distribution holds (Wooldridge 2010: 146). Note also that 
there are no survey data available for the Dominican Republic in 2002 and 2003. Thus, we obtain 178 instead of 180 
clusters. Data for 2012 are not available. 
10 See the website of the Latinobarómetro (http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp; last accessed on 12 
November 2017) for details on the survey methodology. 
11 Some survey waves also include questions about the respondents’ opinion on certain other countries, such as 
Spain, Japan, and the European Union. However, apart from China and the United States, no entity is covered in all 
waves. 
12 This is the case for one quarter of all respondents in our sample. We also tested whether China’s economic 
engagement affects whether people have an opinion on China. This is not the case (results available upon request). 
13 Below we test the robustness of our results to this decision by altering the definition of our dependent variable. 
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2.2 Variables of interest 
China’s economic presence in Latin American is apparent to citizens through its exports, foreign aid, and 
investments. Data on Chinese exports in US dollars are obtained from UN Comtrade (2015) via the World 
Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. Information on Chinese aid in US dollars 
originate from AidData (Dreher et al. 2017; see also Strange et al. 2017). The database covers Chinese 
development projects that would comply with OECD standards on either Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) or Other Official Flows (OOF).14 Finally, data on Chinese OFDI stocks in US dollars 
come from the annual Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment published by the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM 2010, 2012, 2013). 
We divide all three variables of interest by the GDP of the respective Latin American country to 
relate China’s economic activities to the size of the respective economy (see Kleinberg and Fordham 
2010 and Hanusch 2012 for a similar approach; GDP data from World Bank 2016). We use the average of 
the one- and two-year lag of the respective variables for three reasons. First, by using lags, we assure that 
the survey does not predate China’s economic activities. Second, the usage of lags averaged over two 
years allows us to smooth our variables of interests: all three activities, and aid commitments in particular, 
are very volatile. Third, new Chinese OFDI and aid projects are agreed upon several months before the 
actual project starts and it takes time until the population can experience the effects.15 In analogy to the 
China case, we also construct corresponding variables on US exports, US aid, and US OFDI (data from 
UN Comtrade 2015 and OECD 2017). 
Columns 3-8 of Table 1 rank the Latin American countries by the absolute amount of Chinese 
and US exports, OFDI, and aid, respectively, and shows the associated financial values (in millions of 
constant 2010 US dollars). Brazil heads the lists of Chinese exports and investments, while most of 
Chinese aid flows into Venezuela. Mexico is the most important destination of US exports and investment, 
while Colombia is the United States’ favorite aid recipient in Latin America. 
 
2.3 Control variables 
We include control variables both at the country and at the individual level. At the country level, we 
employ three variables to capture the economic situation of China’s partner countries: a country’s logged 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate (both from World Bank 2016), and logged inflation rate (data from 
                                                          
14 We include only projects that have at least reached the commitment stage, i.e., we exclude pledged, canceled and 
suspended projects, and remove so-called umbrella projects to assure that financial values are not double-counted 
(see Dreher et al. forthcoming for a similar approach). The data are highly correlated with data from Gallagher and 
Myers (2014) on economic loans. Since their loan data are less comprehensive than a general official finance 
database and only available since 2005, we use the AidData data instead. To give an impression of the sectoral 
composition of the data, we list the 25 largest projects in Online Appendix A1. 
15 At the same time, the lag length should not be too long as opinions might already be affected by announcements 
of investment and aid projects. We look at various lag lengths in our robustness check section. 
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IMF 2014). Moreover, we include trade openness, i.e., the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP 
(World Bank 2016), to account for a country’s dependence on international trade.16 
In addition, we include three political variables at the country level. First, we add a binary 
variable left government that takes a value of one if the chief executive’s party is communist, socialist, 
social democratic, or any other type of left-wing (data from Beck et al. 2001, own update). This variable 
aims to capture the possibility that individuals living in countries governed by a left-wing government 
might develop more favorable views on communist China. Second, we add a country’s level of 
democracy using data from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2013). Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 
(2015) find that individuals’ support for democracy increases the longer they live in a democracy. 
Accordingly, Latin Americans living in more democratic societies might thus develop a less favorable 
view of autocratic China. Third, we add a binary variable Chinese leader visit, which takes a value of one 
in the years of a visit of a high-ranking Chinese leader (see Online Appendix A2 for definition and 
sources). Chinese leader visits are often associated with huge investment and financing deals and 
typically receive a lot of media coverage (Lin et al. 2017; Fuchs forthcoming) and could thus alter locals’ 
perceptions. 
At the individual level, we account for a set of variables that are commonly employed in analyses 
of individual perceptions (see, for example, Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Bjørnskov et al. 2013; data from 
Corporación Latinobarómetro 2015). Age is a continuous variable that measures the respondent’s age in 
years. Female is a binary variable coded one if the respondent is a woman. Employed is a binary variable 
coded one if the respondent is currently employed or self-employed. Students’ perceptions of China might 
differ from the average non-employed citizens and we thus include a binary variable student. The variable 
education proxies for the respondent’s educational level on a seven-point scale. It ranges from zero for 
illiterate respondents to six for those with a completed university degree. Wealth is a continuous variable 
based on the respondent’s ownership or access to nine basic goods, including drinking water, a 
refrigerator, and television. Finally, urban is a binary variable coded one if the respondent lives in a city 
with more than 50,000 inhabitants. The expected effects of many of these variables on attitudes towards 
China are ambiguous. While more educated people are typically more internationalist, expectations are 
less clear when it comes to wealth. As Zixiao and Zweig (2009: 470) note, a poor individual “may have a 
favourable attitude towards China’s increasing economic power, because it means he can buy 
manufactured goods cheaply; but he also has reasons to harbor an unfavourable attitude towards China, 
because it might threaten his job.” 
In addition to those commonly included socio-demographic variables, we include two 
supplementary controls, which are potentially relevant for individuals’ perceptions of China (Gries and 
                                                          
16 Since one may argue that these country-level controls constitute “bad controls” in the terminology of Angrist and 
Pischke (2008), we show results where we exclude them in the robustness check subsection below. Our findings do 
not hinge on their inclusion. 
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Crowson 2010; Hanusch 2012). First, we create an index variable based on respondents’ evaluation of the 
current economic situation of their country on a five-point scale. Second, we gauge respondents’ political 
attitude by constructing the variable left orientation that ranges from zero for individuals considering 
themselves to be at the far right to ten for those at the far left.17 
The resulting sample includes up to 163,103 observations. Online Appendix A2 provides detailed 
definitions and sources of all variables used. We show the corresponding correlation matrices in Online 
Appendix A3. Table 2 provides the corresponding descriptive statistics. The average respondent is 38 
years old, lives in an urban area (63 percent), is slightly right-leaning (4.70), and has access to five of nine 
assets in our wealth index. She or he is almost equally likely to be a man or woman as well as to be 
employed or not. 77 percent of respondents express a favorable opinion on China, which is slightly larger 
than the corresponding value for the United States (74 percent). 
 
2.4 Regression models 
Our regression analysis proceeds in three steps: We start with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
year-fixed effects, add country-fixed effects, and finally obtain causal estimates using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS). We estimate our binary dependent variable ChinaOpinion using a linear probability 
model to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients.18 Formally, our first model specification reads 
     𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] +  𝐶𝐶′𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1𝛾𝛾 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   (1) 
where 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the opinion of individual i about China in country j in the survey conducted 
in year t; 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] refers to the averages of the once-lagged and twice-lagged values for 
Chinese exports, foreign aid, or OFDI, respectively; 19  Cj,t-1 represents the once-lagged country-level 
controls; and Xi,j,t captures the individual-level controls. Moreover, year-fixed effects, denoted by 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡, are 
included to account for year- and survey-wave-specific events, including those shocks common to all 
Latin American countries.20 Regressions based on equation (1) exploit between-country variation, which 
will enable us to compare our results with cross-sectional evidence in Kleinberg and Fordham (2010) and 
Hanusch (2012). Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level, i.e., at the level of aggregation of 
the variable of interest.  
                                                          
17 The survey question on political views allowed for the answer “none,” which received the second most responses 
from the survey participants. In order to not lose these observations, we replace the “none” answers by the average 
political view in a given country-year. 
18 Results using logit or probit are very similar (results available on request). 
19 Results are similar when using different lag specifications as we discuss below. 
20 To provide an example, these fixed effects capture the average changes in attitudes towards China during the 2008 
Olympic Games in Beijing (Gries et al. 2010). 
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Second, we add country-fixed effects 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗. The inclusion of these fixed effects allows us to mitigate 
the potential omitted-variables biases. For example, they capture time-invariant historical factors or 
cultural ties with China that could explain differences in attitudes between countries.21 
Third, we address the potential endogeneity of China’s economic activities with respect to public 
opinion. The use of fixed effects does not solve the omitted-variable bias caused by unobserved variables 
that vary over countries and time. For example, the 2008 Beijing Olympics could have stimulated Latin 
American imports of consumer goods from China, and, at the same time, a country’s citizens might come 
to view China more positively for reasons unrelated to China’s economic engagement such as the success 
of their country’s Olympic athletes. This implies that, although better opinions on China are observed, 
this finding should not be attributed to an intensification of Chinese economic activities. 
Moreover, the causal direction might also run from opinions to economic engagement. For 
example, individuals might be more likely to buy Chinese goods as they feel an affinity towards China 
(see again Disdier and Mayer 2007), China might invest more in countries where it is welcomed by the 
local population, or China might purposely aid a country whose individuals have relatively negative 
attitudes towards China to improve its image. We thus interpret the coefficients on the ChinaActivity 
variables in regression models based on equation 1 as conditional correlations rather than causal effects. 
To obtain causal effects of China’s economic activities on attitudes towards China, we construct 
instrumental variables and estimate 2SLS models. Our instrumental variables are inspired by Autor et al. 
(2013). Autor et al. argue that the growth in China’s trade is largely driven by the supply of Chinese 
goods rather than changes in demand. Most importantly, China’s WTO accession has been crucial for the 
dismantling of trade barriers and advances in the competitiveness of Chinese producers. The authors 
exploit that these supply shocks have common drivers. They instrument growth in US imports from China 
with Chinese import growth in high-income markets other than the United States. By doing so, they aim 
to identify the component that is exogenous from the perspective of the penetrated market, i.e., the United 
States. 
Analogously, we use the export penetration of Chinese goods in non-Latin American developing 
countries to construct a time-varying variable exogenous to Latin America to instrument Chinese exports. 
We introduce variation across countries by interacting this export penetration variable with the 
geographic distance between Beijing and the capital of the respective Latin American country (data from 
Mayer and Zignago 2011). We expect a negative effect for the interaction variable in the first stage: 
Chinese goods are likely to penetrate markets in geographically closer Latin American countries, ceteris 
paribus, to a larger extent than those in more remote countries as the supply of Chinese goods increases.22 
                                                          
21 Note that we cannot use country-year-fixed effects because our variables of interest are defined at this level. 
22 Our results hold when we replace geographic distance by maritime distance. We also experimented with an 
interaction of the export penetration variable with China’s Cold War trade with a particular country. Specifically, we 
use the average historic trade during the leadership of Mao Zedong (1955-76) as a share of the partner country’s 
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We thus follow a growing number of scholars that construct time- and country-varying 
instrumental variables from the interaction between a time-varying exogenous variable with a variable 
that varies along the cross-sectional dimension.23 Controlling for the main effect of the two interacted 
variables through year- and country-fixed effects, the resulting country- and time-variant interaction term 
is an exogenous instrument under fairly weak conditions (Bun and Harrison 2014; Nizalova and 
Murtazashvili 2016). Our identifying assumption is that opinions on China in countries with different 
distance to Beijing will not be affected differently by changes in Chinese export supply other than via the 
impact of exports. 
A critical reader may raise the following two concerns that are—as we will argue—not valid. 
First, it has been argued that Chinese demand shocks are likely correlated across developing countries. 
However, this would not threaten our identification since the time-fixed effects in our model capture such 
variation that is common to all sample countries. Second, one may be concerned that our observed effects 
are driven by general trade openness of Latin American countries rather than China’s increasing supply of 
export goods. While this is unlikely to be the case given the importance of China’s WTO accession and 
the other factors that affect China’s export supply, we address this concern by including trade openness as 
a control variable and further add the interaction between trade openness and distance to our set of 
controls. Since this (insignificant) variable does not alter our qualitative results, we are confident that our 
instrument is China-specific and not capturing general trade openness.24 
Our instruments for Chinese aid and Chinese OFDI follow the same logic. We interact China’s 
penetration of non-Latin American developing countries with flows of aid and OFDI, respectively, with a 
variable that varies across countries. In the spirit of Nunn and Qian (2014), we use the probability of 
receiving Chinese aid when we instrument Chinese aid and the probability of receiving Chinese OFDI 
flows when we instrument Chinese OFDI. These probabilities are computed as 
1
14
 ∑ 1(𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 > 0)2013𝑡𝑡=2000 , and 114  ∑ 1(𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 > 0)2013𝑡𝑡=2000 , respectively. We expect 
that countries that have a higher likelihood of receiving Chinese aid [OFDI] to benefit more from an 
increased supply of Chinese aid [OFDI]. Simply put, more aid and investment flows to Beijing’s close 
partners when the Chinese government decides to spend more on foreign aid and investment flourishes. 
We thus expect to obtain a positive coefficient on the instrumental variable in the first stage. The 
endogeneity of the probability of receiving aid [OFDI] is not of concern in this setting as the country-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
GDP as an exogenous country-varying variable (data from Barbieri et al. 2009; Barbieri and Keshk 2012). For this 
alternative instrumental variable, we expect a positive coefficient in the first stage as countries with long-term trade 
relationships, and thus a more intimate understanding of China, should be more capable of reaping benefits from 
increased Chinese wealth. Since our results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the interaction of the 
export penetration variable with distance, we do not report these results in detail but they are available upon request. 
23 See, among others, Werker et al. (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014), Chauvet and Erhart (2015), Dietrich and Wright 
(2015), Dreher and Langlotz (2015), Ahmed (2016), and Lang (2016). 
24 Detailed regression results available upon request.25 Note that data on Chinese OFDI starts in 2003, but since we 
use the moving average of the first and second lag, we can compute this variable of interest only for the time period 
2005-2013. 
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fixed effects fully capture this endogeneity. Our identifying assumption is that opinions on China in 
countries with differing probabilities of receiving aid [OFDI] from Beijing will not be affected differently 
by changes in Chinese aid [OFDI] supply other than via the impact of aid [OFDI]. 
Summing up, our first-stage regression reads as follows:      𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] =  𝛽𝛽1 �1𝑁𝑁∑ 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2]𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐=1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�  + 𝐶𝐶′𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1𝛾𝛾1 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿1 + 𝜁𝜁1,𝑗𝑗 +   𝜂𝜂1,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀1,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡         (2) 
where 𝑖𝑖 denotes each of 𝑁𝑁 developing countries outside Latin America, and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 stands for the part of the 
interacted variable that varies across Latin American countries, i.e., the logged distance to Beijing for 
Chinese exports, the probability of receiving an aid project for Chinese aid, or the probability of receiving 
an OFDI project for Chinese OFDI. The corresponding second-stage regression equation is then      𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶ℎ𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2]  +  𝐶𝐶′𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1𝛾𝛾 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿 +  𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
where 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] refers to the fitted values for Chinese exports and aid, respectively, that 
result from our first-stage regressions. 
 Such an instrumental-variables strategy corresponds to a difference-in-differences estimation 
strategy with a continuous treatment. Intuitively, the first difference considers how opinions on China 
change in years with a large supply of Chinese goods, aid, and investments compared to years when the 
supply of these international economic activities is small. The second difference considers how this 
change in opinions differs in close partner countries of China relative to less important partners. As with 
every difference-in-differences estimation, the parallel-trends assumption has to hold. Figure 3 allows us 
to examine two potential sources of inferential error when using a panel-data instrumental-variables 
strategy based on a continuous difference-in-differences estimator: (i) no parallel contemporaneous trends 
in the outcome variable for geographically close and distant countries (column 3 of panel A) and for high- 
and low-probability countries (column 3 of panels B and C), respectively, and (ii) a (non-linear) longer-
run trend that dominates the year-on-year variation (Christian and Barrett 2017). As can be seen from the 
three graphs in column 3 of Figure 3, the variation in the outcome variable is largely parallel for two 
groups based on a sample split at the median of the respective 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , i.e., distance or probability. 
Specifically, China opinion moves similarly for geographically closer and distant importers over the 
observation period (panel A). Analogously, China opinion evolves similarly for frequent and less frequent 
recipients of Chinese aid or investment money over time (panels B and C). Finally, comparing the graphs 
in Figure 3 across columns, we observe no common non-linear longer-run trend for below- and above-
median individuals that is similar for China opinion and each of our variables of interest. Taken together, 
the parallel-trends assumption seems to hold. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Main results 
As a starting point, panel A of Table 3 presents regression results without country-fixed effects as in 
equation 1. This comes with the advantage that we can also analyze the variation in attitudes between 
China’s partner countries in Latin America. While the results in columns 1 and 2 for Chinese exports and 
Chinese aid respectively are based on the full sample period (2002-2013), column 3 is based on a shorter 
time period since Chinese OFDI can only be constructed from 2005-2013.25 The results show a consistent 
picture: all three coefficients of interest are negative and statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
While the negative coefficient on Chinese exports is in line with earlier findings in Hanusch (2012) for 
African citizens, the negative coefficient on Chinese OFDI contrasts his positive finding for investments. 
Quantitatively, the relationship of Chinese OFDI with opinions about China is the most pronounced. An 
increase of Chinese OFDI by one percentage point of GDP is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of a favorable opinion of China of 16.8 percentage points (column 3). The corresponding decreases for 
exports and aid amount to only 0.6 and 3.0 percentage points, respectively. 
This significantly negative correlation between China’s economic activities and attitudes towards 
China across Latin American countries could be spurious. It could simply reflect that certain countries 
have more positive perceptions of China for reasons unrelated to Chinese trade, aid, or investment 
activities that we do not control for in our models. Potential factors include the economic structure or the 
cultural and historical background of countries. 
By adding country-fixed effects, panel B of Table 3 exploits variation within countries over time 
exclusively and thus addresses this concern. We can thus test whether changes over time in the intensity 
of China’s economic activities affect opinions about China. Indeed, China’s economic activities no longer 
show a significantly negative correlation with opinions on China once we control for unobserved country 
characteristics. This finding suggests that, contrary to the widespread criticisms, China’s deepening 
international economic relations with Latin America are not perceived negatively on average on the 
ground. 
To obtain causal estimates, we follow the 2SLS estimation strategy summarized in equations 2 
and 3. The instrumental variables for Chinese exports (the interaction between the logged geographic 
distance to Beijing and the export penetration of developing countries outside Latin America), the one for 
Chinese aid (the interaction between a country’s probability of receiving aid and the aid penetration of 
developing countries outside Latin America), and the one for Chinese OFDI (the interaction between a 
country’s probability of receiving investments and the OFDI penetration of developing countries outside 
Latin America) are all relevant as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics in panel C. With values 
                                                          
25 Note that data on Chinese OFDI starts in 2003, but since we use the moving average of the first and second lag, 
we can compute this variable of interest only for the time period 2005-2013. 
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between 8.84 and 12.06, the first-stage F statistics are close to or above the critical value of 8.96 for a 
maximum bias in the instrument relative to OLS of less than 15 percent (Stock and Yogo 2005). 
Moreover, the results for the first-stage regression are in line with expectations. As expected, the negative 
coefficient on the interaction variable in the first-stage exports regression is in line with the idea that 
exports to geographically close countries increase more than those to more remote countries as the supply 
of Chinese goods increases. Also in line with expectations is our finding of a positive effect for the 
interaction variable in the first-stage aid and investment regressions. The positive coefficient suggests that 
the typical recipients of Chinese aid and investment projects receive more aid and investment projects 
when China’s supply of aid and investments increases. 
Turning to the second-stage regression results, we continue to find no significant effects on public 
opinion about China when controlling for endogeneity. It does not seem that our previous results from 
panel B were considerably biased by reverse causality or joint determination. In contrast to widespread 
perceptions, we find no evidence that China’s economic engagement in Latin America degrades 
individuals’ views of China on average. 
Continuing with the results for our control variables at the country level (see Online Appendices 
B1-B3), we find that favorable opinions about China significantly decrease with a country’s income per 
capita but increase with inflation in most specifications. This suggests that individuals in countries in 
economic distress perceive China more favorably on average. The same holds for more open countries, as 
indicated by the highly significant positive coefficient on trade openness in panel A, but the coefficient 
loses its statistical significance in most specifications once we control for country-fixed effects in panels 
B and C. There is also some evidence that individuals living in a democratic system have a worse 
perception of China. In addition, we find that respondents governed by a left-wing chief executive 
develop more positive views about China. The remaining country-level variables, i.e., unemployment and 
Chinese leader visit, do not reach statistical significance in most regressions. 
Most individual-level controls are significantly related to the respondent’s opinion about China. 
Students, more educated people, and wealthier individuals are more likely to hold positive views about 
China, while females view China more negatively on average. Respondents that judge the current 
economic situation more optimistically, controlling for the actual macro-economic environment, hold 
more positive opinions about China. Finally, age, employed, urban, and left orientation do not appear to 
play a noteworthy role in attitudes towards China. 
While we have so far analyzed average effects, China’s growing economic engagement is likely 
to affect opinions differentially in different strata of the population. In order to get at heterogeneous 
effects, we interact the individuals’ characteristics with the three economic activities of interest. The 
regression results in Table 4 build on the 2SLS regressions in panel C of Table 3, which is our preferred 
specification. We instrument the interactions of our variable of interest with individuals’ characteristics 
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with the interaction of the respective instrument for our variable of interest and the respective 
characteristics variable. The first-stage F statistics given in the table are well above the critical value that 
applies to two instrumented variables of 4.58 for a maximum bias in the instrument of less than 15 
percent in the case of Chinese OFDI and around the threshold in the case of Chinese aid (Stock and Yogo 
2005). Since the F statistics for Chinese exports are in almost all cases below this threshold, this latter set 
of result should be interpreted with great care. 
The significantly negative coefficient on age indicates that older people are more likely to 
develop a less favorable opinion towards China in response to incoming Chinese aid flows. We also find 
that the effect of Chinese aid on attitudes towards China is significantly more positive among students, 
more educated people, wealthier individuals, people living in urban areas, and those who are satisfied 
with the current economic situation, as evidenced by the significantly positive interaction terms. This 
finding is worrisome from a development perspective as aid should be targeted at the needy if it follows 
developmental goals. It is also in line with results in Dreher et al. (2016), according to which richer parts 
of countries receive more Chinese aid rather than less. 
The findings for OFDI point in the same direction. Older, more educated people, and those 
satisfied with the current economic situation develop significantly more positive attitudes towards China 
in response to Chinese investment. This highlights the importance of heterogeneous effects for the 
relationship between attitudes and aid and investments, respectively. The heterogeneity seems less 
pronounced for Chinese exports, which could be driven by the weaker instrument strength. Only older 
individuals are more likely to develop more negative attitudes towards China when a country’s 
penetration with Chinese goods increases.26 In summary, while we find no causal effects of Chinese 
exports, aid, and investment on individual attitudes towards China on average, one should not conclude 
that these economic activities do not affect opinions. It is rather the case that the effects are heterogeneous 
and seem to compensate one another in the aggregate. This is in line with the idea that China’s growing 
engagement creates winners and losers. 
 
3.2 Robustness tests and extensions 
In this subsection, we first estimate variants of the models in Panel C of Table 3 to test the robustness of 
our main finding of a zero effect of China’s economic engagement on average attitudes towards China. 
We then proceed and investigate whether opinions become more polarized even though no average effect 
                                                          
26 It may seem surprising at first that the effect on attitudes towards China is not conditional on respondents’ 
education, which would be in line with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, empirical support for the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem is weak in most of the empirical literature on trade attitudes (see Jäkel and Smolka 2013 for a 
review of the related literature). What is more, the average skill level of a Chinese worker is similar to that of a 
South American worker (see data in Jäkel and Smolka 2013). 
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is visible. Table 5 contains a summary of these results. We show the baseline results of panel C of Table 3 
in the first row for comparison. 
Summarizing the results in panels A-F, the robustness of our findings makes us confident in our 
conclusion that China’s growing economic activities in the respective countries indeed do not deteriorate 
attitudes towards China on average. First, we continue to not reject the null hypothesis of no effect when 
we alter the lag structure of our variables of interest. Specifically, we find similar results when we use the 
one-year lag or two-year lag of the economic activities of interest rather than the average of the two, or 
employ the three-year moving average of the first, second and third lag of each variable (panel A). 
Second, results are robust to changes in the sample. We replicate the regressions for the shorter 2005-
2013 sample, which we have used for the OFDI regressions due to data availability, and remove all 
countries that recognize the government in Taipei on Taiwan rather than the one in Beijing (data from 
Rich 2009; results in panel B). Third, replacing financial values with project numbers, we also find that 
neither the number of aid projects (data from Dreher et al. 2017) nor the number of OFDI projects (data 
from Stone et al. 2017) affect average attitudes of Latin American individuals towards China (panel C). 
The same holds when we replace Chinese OFDI stocks by OFDI flows, or look at total trade with China 
or imports to China rather than Chinese exports (panel C). Fourth, our results are similar when we use 
weighting methods to correct for the unequal sample size across countries and years (panel D). 
Fifth, we consider changes in the control variables (panel E). First, we include additional country-
level covariates to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by omitted variables. These variables 
include measures of a country’s natural resource wealth, the importance of a Chinese diaspora, and 
political relations with China. Specifically, we include a country’s total natural resource rents as a share 
of GDP (data from World Bank 2016), the size of the Chinese diaspora per one million inhabitants (data 
from Priebe and Rudolph 2015), and a country’s voting alignment with China in the United Nations 
General Assembly (data from Voeten 2013, defined as described in Kilby 2009). Our qualitative results 
are not affected by the inclusion of any of the variables (panel E). It is only with Chinese aid that we now 
see a weakly significant negative effect on attitudes towards China when we add any of the three control 
variables—which are themselves all insignificant in the respective regressions. However, since these do 
not appear to represent robust effects, we do not alter our main conclusions. 
There is also no average effect of China’s economic engagement on average opinions on China 
when we exclude—with the exception of the clearly exogenous ones, age and gender—all control 
variables (panel E). One might argue these are in some sense outcomes rather than controls, which would 
make them “bad controls” in the terminology of Angrist and Pischke (2008). For example, controlling for 
per-capita income is at odds with the argument that Chinese investment improves attitudes towards China 
as it boosts economic growth. 
- 18 - 
 
Sixth, our results are similar when we cluster at the country level rather than at the country-year 
level or use the wild bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions resampling at the country level for estimates with 
clustered standard errors (panel F). Seventh, we arrive at the same qualitative conclusions when we use a 
four-point measure of whether the respondent’s opinion on China is very good (4), good (3), bad (2), or 
very bad (1) instead of the simple binary variable (first row of panel G). 
These robustness checks make us confident that there is no average effect of China’s economic 
engagement on individuals’ attitudes towards China. As a next step, we analyze whether individuals’ 
opinions about China become more polarized with China’s growing economic activities in Latin America. 
To test this, we investigate whether stronger economic activities lead to both more very good and more 
very bad opinions. We first change our dependent variable to take a value of one if an individual has a 
very good opinion of China rather than lumping “good” and “very good” together (second row of panel 
G). We then analyze a binary variable that takes a value of one if an individual has a very bad opinion of 
China (third row of panel G). Indeed, our results show that attitudes towards China become more 
polarized with Beijing’s growing trade, aid, and investment activities. The significant negative coefficient 
on Chinese exports shows that individuals develop less very negative attitudes when more Chinese goods 
enter the market (column 1). At the same time, the significant positive coefficient on Chinese aid suggests 
that individuals develop more very negative attitudes towards China in response to incoming aid (column 
2). When investment intensifies in the respondent’s country, both more very negative and more very 
positive views develop, as shown by the two significant positive coefficients (column 3). Taken together, 
Latin Americans seem to form more polarized opinions on China as Beijing’s economic presence 
increases. These results corroborate our findings of heterogeneous effects discussed above. 
 
3.3 Opinion on China and local Chinese aid 
While we have so far estimated the effects of China’s economic activities at the national level on attitudes 
towards China, we now allow for subnational variation in the intensity of China’s engagement. Previous 
research shows that China’s development activities are distributed unequally across provinces within 
countries. According to the results in Dreher et al. (2016), significantly more Chinese aid ends up in the 
birth regions of African leaders, which are typically already among the richer areas of countries. Their 
results suggest that Chinese aid is indeed successful in promoting regional development. One might thus 
hypothesize that those individuals living in areas experiencing Chinese aid locally develop more positive 
attitudes towards China. On the contrary, there are also reasons to expect that China’s image deteriorates 
in exactly those areas. Subnational analyses of Chinese aid suggest, for example, that Chinese aid raises 
the level of corruption and discourages trade union involvement in areas where Chinese development 
projects are carried out (Isaksson and Kotsadamm 2017, forthcoming; Kelly et al. 2016). Moreover, 
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scholarly work hints at the possibility of adverse environmental consequences, albeit with mixed results 
(see BenYishay et al. 2016 on forest loss). 
 It could thus be that the effects of China’s economic activities are localized and thus do not lead 
to significant changes in attitudes towards China at the national level, as suggested by our earlier results 
in Table 3.27 BenYishay et al. (2016) have constructed a subnationally georeferenced dataset on China’s 
development projects in the Tropical Andes in South America (and other ecological hotspots in Africa 
and Asia). This allows us to test for an effect of Chinese aid to subnational regions on the perception of 
China within five countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. We could allocate 52 
project locations to provinces in these five countries.28 In our estimation sample, roughly each seventh 
respondent (2,683 respondents in total) was exposed to Chinese aid in their home region. We construct 
the financial amount of aid projects per province. The map in Figure 4 displays the location of China’s 
project sites across the Andes region. The largest aid amounts were provided to Junín (Peru), followed by 
Bolívar (Venezuela), and Napo (Ecuador).29 Figure 5 provides an overview of the subnational variation in 
attitudes towards China. 
 We augment the analysis in panel B of Table 3 by adding Chinese aid (local), defined as the 
financial amount of aid to the respondent’s home region divided by regional GDP, to our regression 
specification. Regional GDP per capita come from Gennaioli et al. (2013) and end in 2010, which limits 
our estimation period for the subnational analysis to the 2002-2011 period. We calculate regional GDP by 
multiplying regional GDP per capita with regional domestic population from World Bank (2017). We 
also add the variable GDP per capita (ln, local), which measures the per-capita income in the 
respondent’s home region, as a further control. 
Table 6 presents our results. We gradually estimate our model with stricter sets of fixed effects. 
We start with year-fixed effects (column 1), add country-fixed effects (column 2), use country-year-fixed 
effects (column 3), and add region-fixed effects (column 4). The coefficient on Chinese aid (local) does 
not reach statistical significance at conventional levels in any of these specification. In line with our 
results for Chinese aid at the national level, Chinese aid activities in the respondents’ region are not 
associated with significant changes in average attitudes towards China. Our finding of zero average 
effects does not appear to hide significant subnational effects of Chinese aid on attitudes. 
 
                                                          
27 A similar argument can be made for Chinese exports and OFDI but we lack the subnational trade and investment 
data required to carry out such tests. 
28 We follow BenYishay et al. (2016) and use the first subnational administrative region (GADM1), which is a 
departemento, provincia, region, comisaria, or intendencia depending the specific country. In line with our 
treatment of aid entries at the national level, we exclude projects whose status is coded as “Pipeline/identification,” 
“Cancelled,” or “Suspended.” We also exclude projects if the information on the geolocation was not precise enough 
to allocate it to a province. We also disregard projects without information on their financial value. 
29 If a project is located in several provinces, we divide the financial amount by the number of provinces involved. 
This approach is in line with previous work with georeferenced aid data (e.g., Dreher et al. 2016; Briggs 2017; Öhler 
et al. 2017). 
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3.4 Comparison with the United States 
To put our findings into perspective, we contrast the effect of Chinese economic activities on Latin 
American views with the corresponding effect of the U.S.’ economic activities. Survey evidence in 
Goldsmith et al. (2014) on AIDS relief and experimental evidence in Dietrich et al. (2018) on health aid 
in Bangladesh suggest positive effects of US aid on perceptions of the United States. In a large field 
experiment in Uganda, Findley et al. (2017) find that citizens are more likely to support US aid projects 
than Chinese ones. 
We investigate respondents’ opinion about the United States using the same specifications as in 
panel B of Table 3 but replace the dependent variable and the respective economic flows from China with 
their US counterparts. The dependent variable US opinion is a binary variable that equals one when the 
respondent’s opinion about the United States is very good or good, and zero if it is bad or very bad. We 
employ the same control variables with the exception of Chinese leader visit, which we replace by a 
binary variable US leader visit. It takes a value of one in years in which the US President or Secretary of 
State visits a given country (data from Lebovic and Saunders 2016). 
Table 7 shows results from seemingly unrelated estimations with country- and time-fixed 
effects.30 Wald tests allow us to check for significant differences in the coefficients of the variables of 
interest between the China and U.S. regressions. According to columns 1a and 1b, opinions about these 
countries are not related to the exports from the respective country, nor do these coefficients differ 
significantly from one another. The same holds for OFDI as reported in columns 3a and 3b. For aid flows, 
however, we find that US aid relates positively to opinions held about the North American ‘neighbor’ 
(columns 2a and 2b). Specifically, a one-percentage-point increase in US aid as share of GDP is 
associated with a 2.7-point increase in each individual’s probability of having a favorable opinion about 
the United States. The difference in the coefficients on Chinese and US aid is statistically significant at 
the one-percent level (see row “Wald p-value” in Table 7). This suggests that Chinese aid has not (yet) 
helped increase its public image abroad, while American aid does so for the United States. 
This contrasts with the praise of Chinese aid for being faster, less bureaucratic, and more demand-
driven than Western aid (see Bräutigam 2009 for a discussion). Why would the effects of China’s 
development activities on Latin Americans’ opinions be less positive than those resulting from US aid? 
Chinese aid is more prone to misappropriation for the sake of the political or personal interests of 
                                                          
30 Specifically, we run generalized least squares models using Stata’s suest command. We report the results on the 
control variables in Online Appendix B4. Note that we also looked at 2SLS regressions for the United States. The 
IV of US exports is the interaction of the logged geographic distance between Washington, DC and the capital of the 
respective Latin American country and the US export penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. 
The IV of US aid is the interaction between the country-specific probability of receiving US aid over the 2000-2013 
period and the US aid penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. The IV of US OFDI is the 
interaction between the country-specific probability of receiving US OFDI over the 2000-2013 period and the US 
OFDI penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. While our main conclusions hold, these results 
(available on request) should be interpreted with caution as the first-stage F statistics is well below their critical 
values. 
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recipient leaders than ‘traditional’ aid (Dreher et al. 2016). Recent empirical studies also highlight 
adverse effects of Chinese aid in terms of local corruption and environmental degradation (BenYishay et 
al. 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadamm forthcoming; Kelly et al. 2016). Goldsmith et al. (2014: 91) lists the 
following reasons why aid may not be improving public opinion: “Recipients may be unaware of the 
origins of the aid they receive; the donor’s motivations might be seen as primarily self-serving; the 
positive feelings associated with aid may be too small to shift perceptions shaped by more salient and 
dramatic foreign policy behavior; or aid programs may simply fail to work and, therefore, fail to sway 
people’s opinions in the absence of obvious improvements to their quality of life.” China will have to 
work on these fronts if it wants to win hearts and minds with its aid program as the United States is able 
to do. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since the turn of the millennium China has strongly expanded its global economic presence in the 
developing world. As part of its “going out” (zou chu qu, 走出去) policy, starting in 1999, China heavily 
expanded its economic engagement in developing countries in order to fuel its booming economy and 
strategically position itself in a globalized world. The People’s Republic’s rapidly growing economic 
activities are visible in its bilateral trade, foreign aid, and investment overseas. Their growth is 
particularly pronounced in Latin America where China has become a major actor within a decade. While 
economic theory suggests net benefits of increased competition and global integration, Chinese economic 
activities are frequently criticized for their potential adverse consequences on Latin America and its 
citizens. For example, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned in a speech in February 2018 that 
China was “using economic statecraft to pull the region into its orbit” and that Latin America did “not 
need new imperial powers that seek only to benefit their own people.”31 
In this study, we analyzed the public perceptions of China in 18 Latin American economies using 
individual-level survey data from the Latinobarómetro for the years 2002-2011 and 2013. Our study 
focused on the attitudes held by common citizens rather than those of political leaders and decision 
makers. We measure China’s increasing economic presence through its exports, aid, and OFDI to Latin 
America. An instrumental-variables strategy allowed us to identify causal effect on attitudes towards 
China in its partner countries over time. Specifically, we exploited exogenous variation in China’s 
activities outside Latin America to capture the supply of Chinese trade, aid, and investment to Latin 
American countries. 
Our findings do not suggest that China’s growing economic activities in the respective countries 
affect average attitudes towards China. Lingering concerns about the adverse consequences as well as 
overly optimistic depictions of China’s economic activities in Latin America seem exaggerated. Our null 
                                                          
31 See https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/02/277840.htm (accessed 4 March 2018). 
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finding is robust to a battery of robustness tests where we introduce various changes to the sample, 
measurement of our variables, lag structure, and estimation method. This also holds when we investigate 
the localized effects of China’s aid within countries in addition to effects at the national level. However, 
we find that views of China become more polarized with China’s growing economic engagement: more 
individuals develop either very positive or very negative opinions on China. We also observe remarkable 
heterogeneous effects of China’s aid and investment on Latin American attitudes. Most notably, China’s 
image improves among the young, educated, and economically privileged strata of the population. 
These results have implications for different actors. First, the Chinese government may be 
disappointed that its overseas development program is yet to be successful in winning hearts and minds. 
This might be particularly frustrating as, in contrast to China, US aid and opinions about the United States 
show a positive association. China will have to improve the targeting of its aid program if it wants to 
create the goodwill it seeks to obtain as China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid suggests (State Council 
2014). It is potentially comforting for Chinese policymakers that China’s image improves at least among 
the young, urban, and economically privileged. Today’s young are the political and business leaders of 
tomorrow and the rich and urban are typically closer to decision-making processes and may tip the 
balance in Beijing’s favor. The other good news for Beijing is that—despite the often perceived bad 
reputation of Made in China (Ramo 2007)—increasing exports do not deteriorate China’s image as a 
whole. Still, China is yet to reach the stage where its products are aspired to in the rest of the world. 
Second, from the perspective of the US government, it is a relief that China’s soft power strategy 
has not yet been very successful. However, it would not be advisable for Washington to rest. Since China 
has a track record of successful pioneering—or as former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping famously said: 
“crossing the river by feeling the stones”—it is likely to catch up also in the realm of soft power. The 
United States will have to ramp up their efforts if they want to keep the leadership status in their 
“backyard.” 
Third, from a development perspective, it is particularly worrisome that Chinese aid and opinions 
about China are not positively associated. China will have to improve the targeting of its aid program if it 
wants to reach the poor and needy strata of the population. In this regard, it is promising that a new 
emphasis on impact and aid effectiveness is already visible in Beijing’s reform plans (Rudyak 2014). 
Finally, our finding of increasingly polarizing opinions on China should call Latin American 
governments’ attentions. China’s growing economic presence is likely to increasingly fuel political 
debates in developing countries in the near future. To prevent anti-China protests, partner governments 
might want to cushion adverse effects when negotiating deals with Beijing.  
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Figure 1: Individual attitudes towards China and the United States by country (average, 2002-2013) 
 
Notes: Each dot represents the average opinion about China (the United States) of a country’s respondents over the 
2002-2013 period. This is based on individuals’ responses to the question “Do you have a very good, good, bad, or 
very bad opinion of {x}?,” where “{x}” is replaced by either China or the United States. We assign values of 1 (very 
bad) to 4 (very good) to each response. 
 
 
Figure 2: Individual attitudes towards China and the United States by country over time (2002-2013) 
 
Notes: The solid red (dashed blue) line represents the average opinion about China (the United States) of a country’s 
respondents over the 2002-2013 period. This is based on individuals’ responses to the question “Do you have a very 
good, good, bad, or very bad opinion of {x}?,” where “{x}” is replaced by either China or the United States. We 
assign values of 1 (very bad) to 4 (very good) to each response.  
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Figure 3: Testing the parallel-trends assumption 
                                                (1)                                                                       (2)                                                                       (3) 
   
 
Notes: The three graphs in column 1 show the average penetration of non-Latin American developing countries with Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI over time. The three 
graphs in column 2 show the average values of 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,[𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐=1  for the individuals that are below and above the median of the distance to Beijing, the probability 
of receiving Chinese aid, and the probability of receiving Chinese investment, respectively. The three graphs in column 3 show the average opinion on China for the 
individuals that are below and above the median of the distance to Beijing, the probability of receiving Chinese aid, and the probability of receiving Chinese investment, 
respectively. Median values are based on the respective sample in Table 3. 
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Figure 4: Total Chinese aid to Latin American subnational regions (in constant 2014 US$, 2002-2010) 
 
 
Figure 5: Average opinion on China in Latin American subnational regions (2002-2010) 
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Table 1: Latin American countries ranked by attitudes towards China and the United States and by Chinese and US economic activities (2002-2013 average) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variables Variables of interest 
 China opinion US opinion Chinese exports US exports Chinese aid US aid Chinese OFDI US OFDI 
1 Honduras (0.9) Dom. Rep. (0.9) Brazil (13709.8) Mexico (149920.6) Venezuela (705.4) Colombia (664.7) Brazil (547.8) Mexico (79080.1) 
2 Paraguay (0.8) Panama (0.9) Mexico (11878.1) Brazil (26174.2) Ecuador (483.4) Peru (247.2) Venezuela (529.3) Brazil (47848.5) 
3 Nicaragua (0.8) El Salvador (0.9) Panama (6309.0) Venezuela (9253.0) Brazil (465.0) Mexico (243.4) Peru (354.4) Chile (18859.6) 
4 Venezuela (0.8) Honduras (0.9) Chile (5094.9) Colombia (8944.7) Argentina (137.4) Bolivia (153.0) Argentina (325.5) Argentina (13859.5) 
5 Costa Rica (0.8) Costa Rica (0.8) Argentina (3534.2) Chile (8795.5) Bolivia (107.5) El Salvador (119.1) Mexico (178.0) Venezuela (11624.6) 
6 El Salvador (0.8) Nicaragua (0.8) Venezuela (2781.8) Argentina (6065.3) Chile (87.0) Guatemala (105.5) Ecuador (171.2) Peru (6102.7) 
7 Guatemala (0.8) Guatemala (0.8) Colombia (2459.1) Dom. Republic (5879.1) Costa Rica (64.0) Honduras (98.1) Panama (135.4) Panama (5734.2) 
8 Dom. Rep. (0.8) Colombia (0.8) Peru (2081.1) Costa Rica (4725.8) Mexico (26.6) Nicaragua (91.2) Colombia (74.6) Colombia (4884.6) 
9 Peru (0.8) Ecuador (0.8) Ecuador (1072.5) Peru (4636.4) Peru (13.6) Ecuador (67.3) Chile (63.4) Costa Rica (2040.8) 
10 Colombia (0.8) Peru (0.8) Uruguay (875.9) Panama (4406.0) Colombia (5.8) Dom. Rep. (48.5) Bolivia (47.7) El Salvador (1689.8) 
11 Bolivia (0.8) Paraguay (0.7) Guatemala (717.9) Honduras (4125.6) Uruguay (3.6) Brazil (43.0) Paraguay (17.0) Dom. Rep. (1137.8) 
12 Chile (0.8) Chile (0.7) Paraguay (568.6) Guatemala (3836.1) Nicaragua (2.6) Costa Rica (27.6) Uruguay (6.5) Ecuador (1044.9) 
13 Ecuador (0.8) Brazil (0.7) Dom. Rep. (504.4) Ecuador (3506.8) Dom. Rep. (0.0) Paraguay (22.4) Honduras (1.1) Uruguay (952.8) 
14 Uruguay (0.7) Uruguay (0.6) Costa Rica (450.1) El Salvador (2401.3) Panama (0.0) Panama (20.6) El Salvador (1.1) Guatemala (778.2) 
15 Argentina (0.7) Mexico (0.6) Honduras (298.7) Paraguay (1166.1) Paraguay (0.0) Venezuela (14.0) Costa Rica (1.0) Honduras (690.4) 
16 Brazil (0.7) Bolivia (0.6) El Salvador (292.6) Nicaragua (796.1) El Salvador (0.0) Argentina (11.9) Dom. Rep. (0.2) Bolivia (395.5) 
17 Panama (0.7) Venezuela (0.6) Nicaragua (213.2) Uruguay (754.5) Guatemala (0.0) Chile (4.1) Nicaragua (0.2) Nicaragua (262.6) 
18 Mexico (0.7) Argentina (0.4) Bolivia (142.3) Bolivia (408.5) Honduras (0.0) Uruguay (0.7) Guatemala (0.0) Paraguay (179.4) 
Note: Values in parentheses for the variables of interest (exports, aid, and OFDI) are in millions of constant 2010 US dollars. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables     China opinion 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
US opinion 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Variables of interest (millions of constant 2010 US$)    Chinese exports 2.36 4.93 0.08 42.04 
US exports 8.75 7.64 1.54 35.74 
Chinese aid 0.08 0.32 0.00 2.68 
US aid 0.34 0.59 0.00 3.52 
Chinese OFDI 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.76 
US OFDI 6.26 5.98 0.98 44.71 
Country-level controls     GDP per capita 8.17 0.62 6.89 9.16 
Unemployment 7.57 3.65 1.30 18.40 
Inflation 2.07 0.58 0.00 3.98 
Trade openness 66.06 29.33 21.85 154.75 
Left government 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Democracy 7.82 1.97 -3.00 10.00 
Chinese leader visit 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Individual-level controls     Age 38.46 15.90 16.00 99.00 
Female 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Employed 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Student 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Education 2.97 1.72 0.00 6.00 
Wealth 5.12 2.22 0.00 9.00 
Urban 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Current economic situation 1.68 0.93 0.00 4.00 
Left orientation 4.70 2.44 0.00 10.00 
Additional covariates     US leader visit 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
UNGA voting alignment with China 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Resource rents 0.88 0.04 0.74 0.96 
Chinese diaspora per 1,000,000 inhabitants 5831.52 12539.64 94.40 49502.38 
Alternative definitions of the dependent variable     China opinion, 4-step 2.88 0.69 1.00 4.00 
US opinion, 4-step 2.85 0.78 1.00 4.00 
China Opinion, very good=1 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
China Opinion, very bad=1 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Alternative definitions of the variables of interest     Chinese imports 1.26 1.95 0.00 10.48 
Chinese trade 3.62 5.21 0.21 42.17 
Chinese aid projects 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.67 
Chinese OFDI flows 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.22 
Chinese OFDI projects 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.94 
Instrumental variables      Chinese export penetration 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 
Distance 9.65 0.14 9.43 9.87 
Chinese aid penetration 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Chinese aid probability 0.27 0.22 0.00 0.71 
Chinese OFDI penetration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Chinese OFDI probability 0.65 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Note: The descriptive statistics are based on the sample used in Table 3, panel A, column 1.  
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Table 3: Effects of Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI on attitudes towards China (2002-2013) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Chinese exports Chinese aid Chinese OFDI 
Panel A: OLS regressions 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] -0.0055*** -0.0295*** -0.1684*** 
 
[0.001] [0.007] [0.050] 
Control variables Country-level controls, Individual-level controls, Year FE 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0175 0.0158 0.0163 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Panel B: Fixed-effects regressions   
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] -0.001 -0.0066 -0.0147 
 
[0.002] [0.008] [0.062] 
Control variables Country-level controls, Individual-level controls, Year FE, Country FE 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0204 0.0204 0.0219 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Panel C: 2SLS regressions   
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] 0.0074 -0.1274 -0.1385 
 
[0.006] [0.080] [0.217] 
Control variables Country-level controls, Individual-level controls, Year FE, Country FE 
IV 
 
Distance (ln) 
* Export penetration 
Aid probability 
* Aid penetration 
OFDI probability 
* OFDI penetration 
First-stage estimate -181.2212*** 41.2956*** 37.9870*** 
 [52.874] [13.893] [10.939] 
K-P F statistic 11.75 8.84 12.06 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China 
(good or very good). The regression covers the survey waves 2002-2013 in columns 1-2, and, due to the reduced 
availability of Chinese OFDI data, 2005-2013 in column 3. The instrumental variable in column 1 is the 
interaction between the logged geographic distance between Beijing and the capital of the respective Latin 
American country and the export penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. The instrumental 
variable in column 2 is the interaction between the probability of receiving Chinese aid over the 2000-2013 
period and the aid penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. The instrumental variable in 
column 3 is the interaction between the probability of receiving Chinese OFDI over the 2000-2013 period and 
the OFDI penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. Standard errors are robust and clustered at 
the country-year level. K-P F statistic refers to the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic. * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Conditional effects of Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI on attitudes towards China (2002-2013, 2SLS) 
  Age Female Employed Student Education Wealth Urban 
Current 
Economic 
situation 
Left 
ideology 
Chinese exports 0.0148* 0.0087 0.0063 0.0073 0.0057 0.0082 0.0057 0.0084 0.0071 
 [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] 
Chinese exports * characteristic -0.0002* -0.0027 0.0022 0.0024 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0001 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] 
K-P F statistic 3.67 3.50 3.51 5.04 3.63 4.07 3.34 3.81 3.35 
Chinese aid -0.0530 -0.1131 -0.1342* -0.1336* -0.2031** -0.2367* -0.1917* -0.2515** -0.0731 
 [0.090] [0.079] [0.081] [0.080] [0.103] [0.130] [0.098] [0.112] [0.080] 
Chinese aid * characteristic -0.0020* -0.0301 0.0123 0.0625* 0.0226* 0.0216* 0.0872* 0.0571** -0.0109 
 [0.001] [0.022] [0.019] [0.032] [0.013] [0.013] [0.047] [0.028] [0.008] 
K-P F statistic 4.42 4.42 4.42 4.42 4.49 4.58 4.65 4.53 4.42 
Chinese OFDI -0.0042 -0.1412 -0.1429 -0.1402 -0.2523 -0.1081 -0.1906 -0.3349 -0.1342 
 [0.201] [0.219] [0.220] [0.216] [0.221] [0.174] [0.214] [0.230] [0.218] 
Chinese OFDI * characteristic -0.0035* 0.0056 0.0080 0.0184 0.0331** -0.0055 0.0653 0.1058** -0.0008 
  [0.002] [0.046] [0.037] [0.081] [0.016] [0.021] [0.051] [0.042] [0.012] 
K-P F statistic 6.06 6.03 6.04 6.03 6.04 6.16 6.08 6.21 6.06 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very good) and covers the survey waves 2002-2013 
for regressions including the export and the official flows variables and 2005-2013 for regressions including Chinese OFDI data. All regressions include country-level controls, 
individual-level controls, year-fixed effects, and country-fixed effects. The instrumental variable of Chinese exports is the interaction between the logged geographic distance 
between Beijing and the capital of the respective Latin American country and the export penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. The instrumental variable 
of Chinese aid is the interaction between the probability of receiving Chinese aid over the 2000-2013 period and the aid penetration of developing countries outside Latin 
America. The instrumental variable of Chinese OFDI is the interaction between the probability of receiving Chinese OFDI over the 2000-2013 period and the OFDI 
penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. We instrument the interactions of our variable of interest with characteristics with the interaction of the respective 
instrument with characteristics. Columns including Chinese exports or Chinese aid include 154,278 observations and those with OFDI stocks 116,313 observations. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. K-P F statistic refers to the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 5: Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI to Latin American countries: 2SLS (robustness checks, 2002-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Chinese exports Chinese aid Chinese OFDI   Coefficient Std error F stat Obs Coefficient Std error F stat Obs Coefficient Std error F stat Obs 
Baseline 0.0074 [0.006] 11.75 163,103 -0.1274 [0.080] 8.84 163,103 -0.1385 [0.217] 12.06 122,745 
Panel A: Change lag structure             
Only one-year lag 0.0076 [0.005] 11.77 163,103 -0.4305 [0.744] 0.35 163,103 -0.2218 [0.187] 13.46 136,700 
Only two-year lag 0.0071 [0.006] 8.15 163,103 -0.0731 [0.071] 4.28 163,103 -0.2696 [0.375] 4.33 122,745 
Three-year moving average 0.0080 [0.006] 9.06 149,489 -0.0464 [0.053] 11.29 149,489 -0.1483 [0.265] 11.63 108,519 
Panel B: Change sample             
2005-2013 sample 0.0021 [0.006] 7.74 122,745 -0.1359 [0.117] 3.04 122,745 -0.1385 [0.217] 12.06 122,745 
Exclude Taiwan recognizers -0.1789 [0.122] 2.61 105,073 -0.6526 [1.968] 0.11 105,073 0.2686 [0.693] 1.65 78,745 
Panel C: Change variable of interest             
Chinese number of projects     -0.4767 [0.304] 5.75 163,103 0.0094 [0.108] 14.91 163,103 
Chinese OFDI flows         -0.3382 [0.516] 11.30 122,745 
Total trade with China 0.0095 [0.008] 6.48 163,103         
Imports to China -0.0335 [0.025] 3.05 163,103         
Panel D: Weights             
Weighted observations 0.0142 [0.011] 5.84 163,103 -0.1490 [0.100] 6.71 163,103 -0.2317 [0.181] 20.57 122,745 
Panel E: Additional control variables             
Controlled for natural rents 0.0076 [0.006] 11.39 163,103 -0.1117* [0.065] 9.32 163,103 -0.1449 [0.217] 11.88 122,745 
Controlled for Chinese diaspora 0.0061 [0.005] 11.54 163,103 -0.1400* [0.078] 9.12 163,103 -0.1526 [0.227] 12.58 122,745 
Controlled for UNGA voting 0.0085 [0.006] 14.50 163,103 -0.1232* [0.075] 9.69 163,103 -0.1681 [0.240] 10.70 122,745 
No "bad controls" 0.0110 [0.022] 2.12 163,827 -0.0235 [0.049] 10.31 163,827 -0.1496 [0.125] 30.30 123,355 
Panel F: Standard errors             
Cluster by country 0.0074 [0.008] 2.25 163,103 -0.1274 [0.087] 5.88 163,103 -0.1385 [0.201] 5.79 122,745 
Wild bootstrap 0.0074 [0.179] 11.90 163,103 -0.1274 [0.725] 8.34 163,103 -0.1385 [0.449] 12.06 122,745 
Panel G: Change dependent variable             
4-step variable 0.0060 [0.008] 11.75 163,103 -0.1289 [0.119] 8.84 163,103 0.1242 [0.352] 12.06 122,745 
1 if very good opinion of China -0.0048 [0.004] 11.75 163,103 0.0432 [0.054] 8.84 163,103 0.4866** [0.195] 12.06 122,745 
1 if very bad opinion of China -0.0034* [0.002] 11.75 163,103 0.0448* [0.024] 8.84 163,103 0.2239** [0.097] 12.06 122,745 
Notes: The dependent variable in panels A-F is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very good). The dependent variables 
are described in the main text. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level in panels A-E and G. We describe in the main text how we treat the standard 
errors in panel F. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 6: Chinese aid to Latin American subnational regions (2002-2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Chinese aid 0.0009 0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Chinese aid 0.0088 0.0096   
  [0.006] [0.006]     
GDP per capita (ln, local) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (national level) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (individual level) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year FE   Yes Yes 
Region FE       Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0178 0.0187 0.0200 0.0266 
Number of observations 19,651 19,651 19,651 19,651 
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good 
or very good) and covers the survey waves 2002-2011 rather than 2002-2013 due to the limited availability of 
subnational GDP data. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Chinese and US exports, aid and OFDI to Latin American countries: Seemingly 
unrelated estimations (2002-2013) 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
 Chinese US Chinese US Chinese US 
  exports aid OFDI 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2] -0.001  -0.007  -0.011  
 [0.002]  [0.008]  [0.062]  
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,[𝑡𝑡−1,𝑡𝑡−2]  0.000  0.027***  0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.009]  [0.002] 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Wald p-value 0.718 0.007 0.844 
Number of observations 160,969 160,969 145,261 
Number of clusters 178 178 167 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1a, 2a, and 3a is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive 
perception of China (good or very good). The dependent variable in columns 1b, 2b, and 3b is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of the United States (good or very good). The dependent variable 
covers the survey waves 2002-2013 for regressions of exports or aid and 2005-2013 for regressions of OFDI stocks. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
Appendix A1: 25 largest Chinese aid projects in Latin America (2000-2013) 
 
Country Year Title Sector 
Project size 
(m US$) 
1 Venezuela 2013 CDB funds $4 billion PDVSA and CNPC joint venture Sinovensa in Orinoco belt Energy Generation and Supply 4087 
2 Venezuela 2011 ICBC loans Venezuela oil firm 4 billion USD for construction of housing projects Other Social Infrastructure 4440 
3 Brazil 2010 China Development Bank extends $3.5 billion USD loan to Petrobras from $5 billion line of credit Energy Generation and Supply 4402 
4 Ecuador 2011 Ecuador Signs $2B loan with CDB for renewable energy purposes  Other Multisector 2220 
5 Argentina 2011 China provides $1.5 bil to build the Córdoba Metro project Transport and Storage 1665 
6 Ecuador 2013 Ecuador receives $1.4 billion from China for budget General Budget Support 1423 
7 Brazil 2010 $1.23 bln Joint China Exim Bank and Bank of China Loan for Shipbuilding in Brazil Transport and Storage 1547 
8 Ecuador 2009 China invests $1.2 billion in Ecuador's Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oil field Energy Generation and Supply 1629 
9 Ecuador 2010 China Development Bank signs 1 billion USD loan for oil agreement with Petroecuador Energy Generation and Supply 1258 
10 Chile 2012 China agrees to invest 900 million USD in solar energy projects in Chile Energy Generation and Supply 953 
11 Brazil 2008 CDB loans $750 million USD for GASCAC Pipeline Energy Generation and Supply 1034 
12 Venezuela 2012 China committed $691M USD loan to Venezuela for geological survey Industry, Mining, Construction 732 
13 Brazil 2007 China to finance construction of Candiota 3 power plant in Brazil Energy Generation and Supply 940 
14 Ecuador 2010 China Ex-Im bank loans Ecuador 621.7 million USD to build Sopladora hydroelectric plant Energy Generation and Supply 718 
15 Venezuela 2013 EXIM Bank loans 391 million USD for construction of the Paquiven maritime terminal  Transport and Storage 398 
16 Mexico 2011 CDB Loans Up to 375 Million USD to Nextel Mexico for 3G Network Communications 416 
17 Venezuela 2008 China funds 350 million USD for Construction of Metro Lines Transport and Storage 483 
18 Ecuador 2011 China Builds and Funds Minas San Francisco y la Union Hydroelectric Dam in Ecuador Energy Generation and Supply 347 
19 Brazil 2009 China Development Bank Loans Brazilian Telecom Company Oi USD300M for Network Expansion Communications 407 
20 Venezuela 2009 China-Venezuela fund invests on plant construction facilitated by Pequiven  Industry, Mining, Construction 407 
21 Costa Rica 2013 EXIM Bank provides 296 million USD loan for Route 32 renovation Transport and Storage 301 
22 Costa Rica 2013 China Exim Bank loans additional $296 million USD to road expansion project in Costa Rica Transport and Storage 301 
23 Bolivia 2010 China loans Bolivia 295 million USD for construction of telecom satellite Communications 371 
24 Argentina 2012 China loans Argentina 261 million USD for first phase of Gastre wind farm Energy Generation and Supply 276 
25 Bolivia 2010 CDB finances 85% of Bolivia's Túpac Katari (TKSAT-1) satellite Communications 316 
Notes: This table lists the 25 largest Chinese aid projects in the 18 Latin American countries under analysis that comply with either the OECD definitions of official 
development assistance (ODA) or other official flows (OOF) and have reached at least the commitment stage. Data from Dreher et al. (2017).  
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Appendix A2: Sources and definitions of variables used 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
China opinion Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive attitude towards China (good or very good) 
based on the question “I would like to know your opinion about the following countries and powers. Do 
you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion of China?” (note that the introductory sentence 
varies slightly between survey waves) 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
US opinion Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive attitude towards the United States (good or 
very good) based on the question “I would like to know your opinion about the following countries and 
powers. Do you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion of the United States?” (note that the 
introductory sentence varies slightly between survey waves) 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Variables of interest 
Chinese exports  Exports from China to a particular country in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-
year and two-year lags 
UN Comtrade (2015) via WITS and 
GDP from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2016) 
Chinese imports Imports from a particular country to China in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-
year and two-year lags 
UN Comtrade (2015) via WITS and 
GDP from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2016) 
Chinese trade Sum of exports from China to a particular country and of imports to China from a particular country in 
US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and two-year lags 
UN Comtrade (2015) via WITS and 
GDP from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2016) 
Chinese aid Official finance flows, i.e., official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF) from 
China to a particular country in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and two-
year lags [ODA is defined as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: (i) provided by official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which: (a) is administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” OOF is defined by the DAC as “Transactions by the 
official sector with countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients which do not meet the conditions for 
eligibility as Official Development Assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at 
development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25 per cent.” See 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm (accessed 19 February 2018)] 
Dreher et al. (2017) via AidData 
Chinese aid projects Number of official finance projects, i.e., official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows 
(OOF) from China to a particular country per one million inhabitants, average of the one-year and two-
year lags 
Dreher et al. (2017) via AidData 
Chinese OFDI Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) stocks from China in a particular country in US$ (% of 
partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and two-year lags 
MOFCOM (2010, 2012, 2013) 
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Chinese OFDI flows Outward foreign direct investment flows (OFDI) from China to a particular country in US$ (% of partner 
country’s GDP), average of the one-year and two-year lags 
MOFCOM (2010, 2012, 2013) 
Chinese OFDI projects 
 
Number of outward foreign direct investment flows (OFDI) from China to a particular country per one 
million inhabitants, average of the one-year and two-year lags 
Stone et al. (2017) 
US exports Exports from the United States to a particular country (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-
year and two-year lags 
UN Comtrade (2015) via WITS 
US aid Commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) from the 
United States to a particular country in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and 
two-year lags 
OECD (2017) via OECD.Stat 
US OFDI Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) stocks (Benchmark definition 3rd Edition, BMD3) from the 
United States in a particular country in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and 
two-year lags 
OECD (2017) via OECD.Stat 
US OFDI flows Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows (Benchmark definition 3rd Edition, BMD3) from the 
United States to a particular country in US$ (% of partner country’s GDP), average of the one-year and 
two-year lags 
OECD (2017) via OECD.Stat 
Country-level controls 
GDP per capita (ln) Logged GDP per capita of partner country (constant 2005 US$) [NY.GDP.PCAP.KD], one-year lag World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2016) 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) of partner country (modeled ILO estimate) 
[SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS], one-year lag 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2016) 
Inflation (ln) Logged average consumer price inflation rate of partner country, one-year lag IMF (2014) 
Left government Binary variable equal to 1 if the chief executive’s party of the partner country is defined as communist, 
socialist, social democratic or left-wing, one-year lag 
Beck et al. (2001), authors’ update 
Democracy Regime authority on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy), one-year lag 
Marshall et al. (2013) 
Trade openness Trade (% of GDP) [NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS], one-year lag World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2016) 
Chinese leader visit Binary variable equal to 1 in years following a visit to a particular country of at least one of the 
incumbents of the following Chinese leadership positions: President, Vice President, Premier, Vice 
Premier, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, Standing Member of the Politburo of the 
Communist Party, State Councilor, Trade Minister, and Foreign Minister, one-year lag 
Barcena and Rosales (2010); Chen 
(2014); MOFA (2001a,b,c,d,e, 
2004); MOFCOM (2012); Chinese 
Embassies in Argentina (2012) and 
Brazil (2013), Mu (2013); PRC 
(2010a,b); Song (2008, 2014); Yan 
(2006, 2007); Yu (2011); Zhu (2013) 
US leader visit Binary variable equal to 1 in years following a visit to a particular country of the US President or 
Secretary of State, one-year lag 
Lebovic and Saunders (2016) 
UNGA voting Average voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between China and a 
particular country (defined as follows: voting with China gets a 1, voting against China gets a 0, 
abstain/absent when the partner country votes coded as 0.5), one-year lag 
Voeten (2013), refined as described 
in Kilby (2009) 
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Natural resource rents Total natural resources rents (% of partner country’s GDP) [NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS], one-year lag World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2016) 
Chinese diaspora Number of persons of Chinese ancestry that reside in a particular country (% of 1,000,000 inhabitants), 
interpolated and extrapolated, , one-year lag 
Priebe and Rudolph (2015) 
Individual-level controls 
Age Stated age of the respondent in years Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Female Binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent is female Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Employed Binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent states to be employed or self-employed in response to the 
question “What is your current employment situation?”, where possible answers include “Self-
employed,” “Salaried employee in a state company,” “Salaried employee in a private company,” 
“Temporarily out of work, retired/pensioner,” “Don’t work/responsible for shopping and housework,” 
and “Student” 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Student 
 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent states to be a student in response to the question “What is 
your current employment situation?” 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Education Respondent’s educational attainment on an 7-point index from 0 to 6 (coded based on the respondent’s 
answer at which age full-time education was completed; larger values correspond to higher levels of 
education) 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Wealth Asset index defined as the number of affirmative answers to the following question “Do you or any 
member of your family have any of the following goods?”, where we count nine items (i.e., those that are 
included in all survey waves): refrigerator, own home, computer, washing machine, telephone, car, 
drinking water, hot running water, and sewage system 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Urban Binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a city with more than 50,000 inhabitants Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Current economic 
situation 
Respondent’s assessment of the current economic situation on a 5-point scale based on the response to 
the question “In general, how would you describe the country’s present economic situation? Would you 
say it is…?”, where possible answers include “Very good” (4); “Good” (3); “About average” (2); “Bad” 
(1), and “Very Bad” (0) 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Left orientation Respondent’s self-assessed political orientation on an 11-point scale based on the response to the 
question “In politics, people normally speak of “left” and “right”. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is 
right, where would you place yourself? (variable recoded so that larger values represent more leftist 
views) 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2015) 
Instrumental variables 
Distance (ln) Simple distance between capitals (km), logged Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
Chinese export 
penetration 
Average share of Chinese exports in a developing country’s GDP (excluding all Latin American 
countries and not only those in the sample), average of the one-year and two-year lags 
UN Comtrade (2015) via WITS and 
GDP from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2016) 
Probability to receive 
Chinese aid 
Average probability of a particular country to receive Chinese aid in the years 2000-2013 Dreher et al. (2017) via AidData 
Chinese aid penetration Average share of Chinese aid in a developing country’s GDP (excluding all Latin American countries Dreher et al. (2017) via AidData 
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and not only those in the sample), average of the one-year and two-year lags  
Probability to receive 
Chinese OFDI 
Average probability that a particular country receives Chinese investment inflows in the years 2003-
2013 
MOFCOM (2010, 2012, 2013) 
Chinese OFDI 
penetration 
Average share of Chinese OFDI in a developing country’s GDP (excluding all Latin American countries 
and not only those in the sample), average of the one-year and two-year lags  
MOFCOM (2010, 2012, 2013) 
Subnational analysis 
Local Chinese aid Official finance flows, i.e., official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF) from 
China to the respondent’s home region in US$ (% of GDP of the respondent’s home region), average of 
the one-year and two-year lags 
BenYishay et al. (2016) and GDP 
data from Genniaioli et al (2013) and 
population data from World Bank 
(2017) 
GDP per capita (ln, 
local) 
Logged subnational GDP per capita multiplied with the estimated population size at the first 
administrative level below the national level, one-year lag (note: data ends in 2010) 
Genniaioli et al (2013) and 
population data from World Bank 
(2017) 
Notes: The GDP data to calculate shares in GDP of various variables has been obtained from the World Development Indicators (defined at market prices in current 
US$ [NY.GDP.MKTP.CD], World Bank 2016). 
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Appendix A3: Correlation matrices 
(a) China opinion, US opinion and variables of interest 
 
China 
opinion 
US 
opinion 
Chinese 
exports 
Chinese 
aid 
Chinese 
OFDI 
China opinion 1     
US opinion 0.214 1    
Chinese exports -0.0294 0.0937 1   
Chinese aid -0.00153 0.00759 -0.0525 1  
Chinese OFDI -0.0245 0.0360 0.609 0.400 1 
 
(b) China opinion, US opinion and country-level controls 
 
China 
opinion 
US 
opinion 
GDP per 
capita (ln) 
Unem- 
ployment 
Inflation 
(ln) 
Trade 
openness 
Left 
govern- 
ment 
Demo- 
cracy 
Leader 
visit 
China opinion 1         
US opinion 0.210 1        
GDP per capita (ln) -0.0671 -0.0810 1       
Unemployment -0.0149 -0.0272 0.281 1      
Inflation (ln) 0.0389 -0.0590 0.0382 0.149 1     
Trade openness 0.0469 0.152 -0.292 -0.239 -0.0303 1    
Left government -0.0039 -0.0330 0.152 -0.125 -0.0738 -0.191 1   
Democracy -0.0215 0.0270 0.0523 -0.0716 -0.366 0.175 0.220 1  
Chinese leader visit -0.0291 -0.0615 0.206 0.0764 -0.104 -0.178 0.130 0.0753 1 
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(c) China opinion, US opinion and individual-level controls 
 
China 
opinion 
US 
opinion Age Female Employed Student Education Wealth Urban 
Current 
economic 
situation 
Left 
orien- 
tation 
China opinion 1           
US opinion 0.210 1          
Age -0.0184 -0.0350 1         
Female -0.0180 0.0304 -0.0200 1        
Employed 0.00123 -0.0122 -0.0224 -0.296 1       
Student 0.0176 -0.00559 -0.322 0.00680 -0.297 1      
Education 0.0259 -0.0428 -0.230 -0.00853 -0.0358 0.181 1     
Wealth 0.00479 -0.0475 0.0268 -0.0106 -0.0298 0.111 0.424 1    
Urban -0.00538 -0.0399 0.0183 0.0163 -0.0129 0.0368 0.198 0.248 1   
Current economic 
situation 0.0356 0.0176 -0.0192 -0.0374 0.0122 0.0217 0.0560 0.0965 -0.00700 1  
Left orientation -0.00508 -0.130 -0.0348 -0.00528 0.00536 0.0196 0.0476 0.0245 0.0302 0.0166 1 
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Appendix B1: Effects of Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI on attitudes towards China: OLS with year-
fixed effects (2002-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Chinese exports -0.0055***   
 
[0.001]   
Chinese aid  -0.0295***  
 
 [0.007]  
Chinese OFDI   -0.1684*** 
 
  [0.050] 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.0365*** -0.0527*** -0.0496*** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Unemployment 0.0010 0.0003 0.0018 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Inflation (ln) 0.0229*** 0.0283*** 0.0233** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] 
Trade openness 0.0011*** 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Left government 0.0052 0.0144 0.0129 
 
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] 
Democracy -0.0018 -0.0034 -0.0049** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Chinese leader visit -0.0226 -0.0213 -0.0016 
 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.029] 
Age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female -0.0131*** -0.0131*** -0.0147*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Employed -0.0009 -0.001 0.0014 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Student 0.0129*** 0.0132*** 0.0166*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Education 0.0087*** 0.0082*** 0.0102*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Wealth 0.0027** 0.0034*** 0.0020* 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Urban -0.003 -0.0029 -0.0045 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Current economic situation 0.0201*** 0.0188*** 0.0201*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Left orientation -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0175 0.0158 0.0163 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Notes: This table presents detailed regression results of the regression results summarized in panel A of Table 3. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very 
good). The regression covers the survey waves 2002-2013 in columns 1-2, and, due to the reduced availability of 
Chinese OFDI data, 2005-2013 in columns 3-5. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix B2: Effects of Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI on attitudes towards China: OLS with country- 
and year-fixed effects (2002-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Chinese exports -0.001   
 
[0.002]   
Chinese aid  -0.0066  
 
 [0.008]  
Chinese OFDI   -0.0147 
    [0.062] 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.1111 -0.1339* -0.2355** 
 
[0.078] [0.075] [0.098] 
Unemployment -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0000 
 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Inflation (ln) 0.0247*** 0.0230*** 0.0247** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.012] 
Trade openness 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Left government 0.0288** 0.0308** 0.0380** 
 
[0.013] [0.012] [0.015] 
Democracy -0.0034 -0.0039 0.0008 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Chinese leader visit -0.0216 -0.0221 -0.0006 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.017] 
Age 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0148*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Employed -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0012 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Student 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 0.0140*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Education 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Wealth 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Urban -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.006 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
Current economic situation 0.0205*** 0.0205*** 0.0214*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Left orientation 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0204 0.0204 0.0219 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Notes: This table presents detailed regression results of the regression results summarized in panel B of Table 3. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very 
good). The regression covers the survey waves 2002-2013 in columns 1-2, and, due to the reduced availability of 
Chinese OFDI data, 2005-2013 in columns 3-5. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
- 47 - 
 
Appendix B3: Effects of Chinese exports, aid, and OFDI on attitudes towards China: 2SLS with country- 
and year-fixed effects (2002-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Chinese exports 0.0074   
 
[0.006]   
Chinese aid  -0.1274  
 
 [0.080]  
Chinese OFDI   -0.1385 
    [0.217] 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.2481** -0.2557** -0.153 
 
[0.107] [0.113] [0.168] 
Unemployment 0.0003 -0.0053 -0.0008 
 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Inflation (ln) 0.0156 0.0117 0.0255** 
 
[0.010] [0.013] [0.013] 
Trade openness -0.0001 0.0015* 0.0004 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Left government 0.0411*** 0.0405*** 0.0426** 
 
[0.015] [0.014] [0.019] 
Democracy -0.0054 -0.0092* -0.0013 
 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] 
Chinese leader visit -0.0282* -0.0177 -0.0025 
  [0.016] [0.015] [0.017] 
Age 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0148*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Employed -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0013 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Student 0.0136*** 0.0131*** 0.0140*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Education 0.0090*** 0.0083*** 0.0089*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Wealth 0.0032*** 0.0038*** 0.0033*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Urban -0.0061* -0.003 -0.0058 
 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Current economic situation 0.0203*** 0.0209*** 0.0215*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Left orientation 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV type Distance (ln) Aid probability OFDI probability 
 
* Export penetration * Aid penetration * OFDI penetration 
K-P F statistic 11.75 8.84 12.06 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0193 0.0155 0.0217 
Number of observations 163,103 163,103 122,745 
Number of clusters 178 178 144 
Notes: This table presents detailed regression results of the regression results summarized in panel C of Table 3. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very 
good). The regression covers the survey waves 2002-2013 in columns 1-2, and, due to the reduced availability of 
Chinese OFDI data, 2005-2013 in columns 3-5. The instrumental variable in column 1 is the interaction between the 
logged geographic distance between Beijing and the capital of the respective Latin American country and the export 
penetration of developing countries outside Latin America. The instrumental variable in column 2 is the interaction 
between the probability of receiving Chinese aid over the 2000-2013 period and the aid penetration of developing 
countries outside Latin America. The instrumental variable in column 3 is the interaction between the probability of 
receiving Chinese OFDI over the 2000-2013 period and the OFDI penetration of developing countries outside Latin 
America. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix B4: Comparison of Chinese and US exports, aid/ODA and OFDI to Latin American countries: Seemingly unrelated estimations (2002-2013) 
  China United States China United States China United States 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Chinese/US exports -0.001 [0.002] 0.000 [0.003]         
Chinese/US aid     -0.007 [0.008] 0.027*** [0.009]     
Chinese/US OFDI                 -0.011 [0.062] 0.001 [0.002] 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.114 [0.076] -0.027 [0.123] -0.136* [0.074] -0.039 [0.118] -0.236** [0.095] 0.100 [0.164] 
Unemployment -0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.004] -0.001 [0.003] 0.002 [0.004] 0.000 [0.003] 0.007 [0.005] 
Inflation (ln) 0.025*** [0.009] 0.000 [0.012] 0.024*** [0.009] -0.003 [0.012] 0.026** [0.012] 0.006 [0.017] 
Trade openness 0.000 [0.000] -0.001 [0.001] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] -0.001 [0.001] 
Left government 0.029** [0.013] 0.008 [0.016] 0.031** [0.012] 0.011 [0.015] 0.038** [0.015] 0.007 [0.018] 
Democracy -0.003 [0.003] -0.001 [0.006] -0.004 [0.003] -0.001 [0.005] 0.001 [0.003] -0.003 [0.006] 
Chinese/US leader visit -0.021 [0.015] -0.037* [0.022] -0.021 [0.015] -0.037* [0.022] 0.000 [0.017] -0.043* [0.023] 
Age 0.000 [0.000] -0.001*** [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] -0.001*** [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] -0.001*** [0.000] 
Female -0.013*** [0.003] 0.026*** [0.003] -0.013*** [0.003] 0.026*** [0.003] -0.014*** [0.003] 0.025*** [0.003] 
Employed 0.000 [0.003] -0.007** [0.003] 0.000 [0.003] -0.007** [0.003] 0.001 [0.003] -0.006** [0.003] 
Student 0.013*** [0.004] -0.010** [0.005] 0.014*** [0.004] -0.010* [0.005] 0.014*** [0.005] -0.011* [0.006] 
Education 0.009*** [0.001] -0.002 [0.001] 0.009*** [0.001] -0.002 [0.001] 0.009*** [0.001] -0.001 [0.001] 
Wealth 0.003*** [0.001] 0.001 [0.001] 0.003*** [0.001] 0.002 [0.001] 0.003*** [0.001] 0.001 [0.001] 
Urban -0.005 [0.003] -0.004 [0.004] -0.005 [0.003] -0.004 [0.004] -0.006 [0.004] -0.005 [0.005] 
Current economic situation 0.021*** [0.002] 0.016*** [0.005] 0.021*** [0.002] 0.016*** [0.005] 0.022*** [0.002] 0.013** [0.005] 
Left orientation 0.000 [0.001] -0.020*** [0.002] 0.000 [0.001] -0.020*** [0.002] 0.000 [0.001] -0.021*** [0.002] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Wald (p-value) 0.733 0.003 0.734 
Number of observations 152,351 152,351 137,604 
Number of clusters 178 178 167 
Notes: This table presents detailed regression results of the regression results summarized in Table 7. The dependent variable in columns 1a, 2a, and 3a is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the individual has a positive perception of China (good or very good). The dependent variable in columns 1b, 2b, and 3b is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has a positive perception of the United States (good or very good). The dependent variable covers the survey waves 2002-2013 for regressions of exports or aid and 
2005-2013 for regressions of OFDI stocks. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
